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ABSTRACT 
The article adds to research on in-work poverty, ‘precarious’ work and informal 
economic activity. It provides ethnographic data on mobility between formal and informal 
work in Russia; industrial ‘normative’ employment is seen as precarious due to on-the-job 
insecurity (Standing 2011). Insecurity is understood through the prism of low-wages, lack 
of control over work processes, but above all the imperative on workers to become flexible, 
self-regulating subjects of the reformed neoliberal Russia. The discourse of 
self-governmentality is contrasted by informants to interpretations of more benign 
production regimes under socialism (Burawoy 1992). Exit strategies from, and discourses 
of resistance to, the new strictures of waged employment are then examined. These are 
sustained by access to an embedded blue-collar identity, and the social networks that 
support and reinforce such ties. 
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Driving through the industrial zone on the main road into Izluchino, a small town 
three-hours from Moscow, the most visible sign of work is not the cement mixing plant or 
linoleum rolling mill of the surviving post-Soviet enterprises, but the informal economy, by 
some accounts contributing nearly half Russia’s GDP (Andrews et al 2011): swarms of 
gypsy cabs, utility vehicles of self-employed (and unregistered) construction workers 
making their way to and from the mushrooming private developments, and the 
impoverished sellers of seasonal produce at the side of the road. There are five taxi outfits in 
Izluchino; at peak times there around twenty taxis parked up in the dusty and potholed 
unpaved central ‘square’ – their drivers are all men, young and old, who have more or less 
given up on formal work. The chances of winning more than a local, one-dollar-fare 
equivalent, per hour are slim; most people travelling further afield use the hourly bus 
service to the oblast capital. In any case each driver has to pay a hefty fee to the dispatchers 
in order to work, not to mention buying their own radio set and ‘checkers’ roof-sign. So 
why would someone give up even poorly paid permanent work in manufacturing or 
processing plants for such an uncertain, indeed precarious existence? Sasha, a skilled forklift 
driver, had frequently switched between formal employment to own-account work as a 
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gypsy cab-driver. By 2010 he had enough of the cement factory, where he had been 
working for the last 18 months:  
 
‘I’ll go back to taxidriving. “Stuff the job” - that’s what I said to the supervisor. 
I was one of the best shift workers there, but they never leave you alone. It’s 
like they can’t bear to see you not busy, even if you’ve stacked your batch in 
half the time it took the other team’. 
 
Sasha explained how, despite fulfilling his side of the ‘bargain’: working skilfully and 
quickly without supervision, managers at the plant were not satisfied, giving extra duties 
once he had completed primary tasks. Sasha had a socialist-era understanding of the moral 
economy of production and refused to become a ‘reflexive’ worker; the ‘price’ he paid was 
increasing recourse to informal work. 
Other factors that made the permanent job ‘not worth it’ were uncertainty about 
benefits: sometimes requests for time off were denied when shifts were stretched, other 
times workers encountered enforced furlough during slack seasons; a more generalised 
resistance to defer to intermediate supervisors whose roles were perceived as little more than 
spying and ‘snitching’ on workers; and finally, the factory jobs’ ‘abysmally low level of 
wages’ (Morrison 2008: 149) which, while meeting escalating energy and food bills, offer 
little chance for savings and long-term household security and reproduction. The 
prioritisation of such factors as contributing to formal work as precarious varied, but 
nonetheless a key articulation clearly emerged: low pay and a lack of a social wage (benefits 
and entitlements that were taken for granted in the socialist era). A significant secondary 
consideration was the interpretation of over-individualised supervision at work coupled 
with a loss of shop-floor autonomy. Finally, the existence of a dense social network that was 
a product of scarcity under during the Soviet period and which is now playing a major role 
in facilitating informal work in the post-Soviet period. While workers cannot organise to 
resist poor shop-floor work-relations, they are still able to access a broad range of contacts 
to facilitate temporary or permanent ‘flight’ into the informal economy. The shift in 
workplace control under neoliberal production regimes is the locus of discontent among 
workers; while this may not be generalisable throughout blue-collar employment, the 
ethnographic materials presented show that resistance to governmentality and a perceived 
loss of ‘dignity’ in labour are also pertinent to understandings of precarity as is inadequate 
remuneration, and reflect diverse and generalised understandings of precarity today. Clarke 
(2007) has argued that the subordination of production to the law of value means line 
managers have fundamentally changed from being representatives of collectives (the 
traditional Soviet role) to agents of management, a process this research shows is well under 
way even in economically and spatially marginal places.  
Scholarship on insecure or precarious work in industrialised countries often 
describes non-standard or contingent employment practices and contracts. Thus precarious 
work is defined in a number of ways, but always in counter-distinction to a normative 
conceptualisation of a stable, full-time job with a single employer. This model presupposes 
a worker in secure standard employment has access to benefits and entitlements, work 
security and representation, and can expect to be employed long-term (Kalleberg 2009, 
Standing 1999, Vosko et al. 2003). While not seeking to redefine the term ‘precarity’, this 
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article shows how manual industrial workers like Sasha interpret formal, permanent 
employment as just as insecure as informal work. In post-socialist Europe, the focus of 
recent research has been on in-work poverty leading to the necessity of portfolio 
employment in a variety of formal and informal jobs (Stenning et al. 2010: 90-101; see also 
Williams and Round 2007). The present research extends this analysis to examine precarity 
among the working poor, not only in terms of income security – although undeniably real 
incomes in Russia have not kept pace with inflation in the last 20 years. Attention is also 
paid to job (as opposed to employment-) insecurity (Standing 2011): a lack of control over 
work processes and over-individualised work relations are the main factors perceived as 
making work precarious, even for those permanently employed. This, in the well 
documented absence of any organised labour response to working-class pauperisation 
(Crowley 2001), and the loss of enterprises’ social assets available to workers in the socialist 
period, contributes to the explanations for permanent and temporary exit from formal 
work. While previous research has found the opposite tendency to that explored here: 
workers seeing low-paid formal sector as safer because of the problem of employer 
authoritarianism in the informal sector (Yaroshenko et al 2006), the current research shows 
the dynamic nature of the transformation of the Russian economy, especially in western 
Russia, where proximity to the capital Moscow means that labour is always in demand. 
Like much anthropological research, the process of ethnography itself is generative of 
analytical categories. Thus the research question ‘why do normative workers often seek exit 
from the formal economy?’ arises inductively out of the grounded approach of the 
fieldwork itself (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  
Workers’ responses to job insecurity must also be viewed through the lens of a 
‘moral order’ (Burawoy 1992: 102) of shop-floor industrial relations that acknowledges the 
primacy of labour. This interpretive position of workers towards work persists after 
socialism and can be seen as a mnemonic resource which is drawn on to judge the present 
(Straugh 2007). Burawoy convincingly argued that production under socialism necessitated 
a significant degree of labour autonomy on the shop-floor; due to the shortage economy 
and other factors, workers engaged in self-organisation (ibid: 108), and were active, flexible 
solvers of production problems. Self-esteem, dignity-in-labour, the social value of work in 
people’s lives (Alasheev 1995), and mutual recognition as agents of production were all 
psycho-social benefits that accrued under this regime. Disillusionment and the search for 
alternatives to waged work are observed when production processes that involved a degree 
of adaptive, reciprocal ‘lateral cooperation’ (ibid: 100-1) fall away and are replaced by 
technical and managerial imperatives contradictorily stressing both closer supervision and 
self-discipline.1 In recent sociologies of production, recourse to Foucauldian theories of 
governmentality (Miller and Rose 1990, Larner 2000) has been useful in drawing attention 
to the degree in which workers of all kinds are hailed as self-regulating subjects – induced 
to ‘work upon themselves’ to become ever more flexible to the demands of post-Fordism 
(Atkinson 2010). However, this ethnography shows how socially-embedded labour is able 
to resist hegemonic discourses of flexible subordination of self in formal work. At the same 
time labour draws on lay conceptions of entrepreneurialism in order to mitigate against 
formal job insecurity. This is predicated on a shared social identity – a blue-collar network 
of solidarity – rather than ‘individualisation’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, Atkinson 
2010: 414). For example, ‘shame’ in exit from formal work is ineffective as a technology of 
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governmentality (Bjerg and Staunæs 2011) due to informants access a social network in 
which a critical discourse on industrial employment is sustained.  
The focus in this research then is on highlighting the social, historical and spatial 
particularity of insecurity and responses to it. The significance of (on-the-)job insecurity, in 
addition to employment or income insecurity is in contrast to the focus on casualisation 
and part-time employment in research on insecure work in other developed countries2 (see 
Rodgers 1989: 2-4, Standing 1999 and 2009, Thornley, et al. 2010, Vosko 2006). This 
approach can be usefully compared to other workplace studies on ‘entrepreneurship’ 
among people with the little socio-economic capital, such as Macdonald’s research on 
informal work among benefit claimants in the north of England (1994). Similarly, Russian 
informants successfully access class-based resources through peer recognition of experience, 
self-presentation as a skilled worker (ibid), but above all thanks to membership of a socially 
narrow (Smith 2010), or horizontal (Burawoy 2001: 1113, Dunn 2004), network. 
Unsurprisingly this is both the strength and a weakness of blue-collar workers management 
of insecurity: the resources that provide alternatives to waged labour cannot unbind the 
class-rooted limitations of those alternatives. In addition, with my focus on shop-floor 
culture: the network of ties, loyalties, and norms workers develop, I enact a dialogue with 
past studies of socialist and post-socialist work places and workers (in particular Burawoy 
1992). Indeed it is Burawoy who recently restated the urgent need to look at the actually 
lived experience of alternative capitalisms when so many analyses of such societies ‘exclude 
subordinate classes, which in effect become the bewildered – silent and silenced – 
spectators of transformations that engulf them’ (2001: 1107). 
Thus, following in the steps of studies of the particular shop-floor cultures and 
worker-enterprise relations of socialism (Burawoy 1992) and post-socialism (Ashwin 1999, 
Dunn 2004, Morrison 2008) this article uses the case study of Russian blue-collar workers 
to show how despite their insecure position, the working poor do make use of identities, 
performances and memory to manage the insecurity of formal work. This is not to say that 
these informants working in the cement works, linoleum factories and lime kilns of 
provincial Russia represent a ‘solidaristic labour community’ (Standing 2011). On the 
contrary, formally labour, with a few exceptions (e.g. see Ilyin 2006) remains atomized in 
Russia and civil society feeble. However, workers seeking temporary and permanent exit 
strategies from precarious employment make the most of place- and class-embedded social 
networks of support: values of ‘reciprocity and fraternity’, that Standing argues belong to 
an occupational community, and that the precariat lack. This article recognises the useful 
differentiation of aspects of precarity that Standing’s theorisation makes, but seeks to 
broaden out the view of insecure work that mainly focuses on the rise of temporary and 
contingent work in the global north and which brackets off of the traditional (blue-collar) 
working class as somehow peripheral to the processes of globalisation and neoliberalism at 
the root of precarious work (ibid). 
 
 
Ethnographic Methods and the Social Geography of the ‘Company Town’ 
Research materials were gathered in the Kaluga region of European Russia over 
three extended periods, totalling 6 months of ethnographic fieldwork, between November 
2009 and December 2010. The main tools were participant and non-participant 
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observation and semi-structured interviews. Around 20 workers who discussed moving 
from formal to informal work comprise the core of informants for this ethnography. They 
were drawn from a variety of enterprises; all were engaged in shop-floor manual work. 
Examples of such labour include meat packaging and processing, welding of prefabricated 
components and structures for the construction industry, manufacture of specialist 
industrial filters, assembly of domestic-use PVC windows and home improvement 
products, repair and maintenance of piped hot-water systems (at both settlement and 
household scale), cement mixing and maintenance of construction vehicles. Living within 
and participating in three different worker households I was able to witness the relevance of 
the ever present network of extended family, friends and other social resources that people 
rely on in gaining work both within and outside the formal economy. In addition, I visited 
most informants’ places of work, and in some cases was able to spend time on the shop 
floor working and observing. In addition, a small number of interviews were conducted 
with local business owners, some of whom were employers of the key informants. 
From the twenty core informant and participants in the research, the present 
article brings into sharp focus four work-life trajectories that are as far as possible 
representative of the possible tensions and negotiations of formal-to-informal work in the 
field site that the researcher encountered. As an example of ethnography, this research aims 
more towards interpretive validity than representative generalisability, but nonetheless, the 
limited paths trodden by the Russian manual worker post 1991 are all too apparent and 
allow for a tentative claim for this research’s wider relevance.    
All four of the case studies selected are men and the research presented is 
male-centric. Female informants were important in gaining a rounded picture of household 
strategies in general and, crucially, where it was possible to interview them separately, a 
further perspective on the male interpretations of work. A comparison of male to female 
attitudes towards subordination at work is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is 
worth mentioning that women encountered in this research were more able, and perhaps 
willing to respond compliantly to the newly reflexive demands of work. Tentatively then I 
support existing research which suggests that men and women have responded differently 
to economic restructuring (see Ashwin 2006). Three of the four key informants have 
partners and dependent children. Given the tradition of a male breadwinner in Russia, the 
hurdles to giving up a ‘stable’ job are significant. The research shows that married men can 
pursue this escape route without censure. 
The field site encompasses a district (raion) containing two small towns 
(populations 15000 and 20000) about 30km from the region (oblast) capital. During the 
Soviet period both towns were dominated by single employers. The smaller town, which I 
call Izluchino3, the focus of the present research, was a ‘company town’ – built from scratch 
in the post-war period around local extractive industries and manufacturing. ‘Company 
town’ translates the Russian term ‘town-formative enterprise’; in practice this was a single, 
extensive, industrial enterprise responsible for building the housing and other social 
infrastructure throughout the town and industrial zones. The enterprise provided the vast 
majority of the relatively well-paid blue-collar work in the town as well as work-benefits 
such as canteens, transport and leisure facilities to the chiefly male workers and their 
dependents.4 Like most company towns, Izluchino exerted a strong pull-effect on labour 
from neighbouring districts and regions, partly because employment guaranteed rapid 
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access to company-provided housing (in the 1980s some workers were allocated permanent 
housing in five-storey apartment blocks within six months of arrival). In the 1990s most of 
these flats became the private property of the occupier, providing both a significant 
disincentive to labour mobility despite the economically parlous situation in the district, 
but also a sense of security, in that periods of unemployment were ‘survivable’. 
The ‘company town district’ has been identified as one of a small number of types 
of urban neighbourhood in the USSR (Lehmann and Ruble 1997). The social character of 
such a locality was and remains overwhelmingly blue-collar to this day. Despite the 
splitting up in the mid 1990s of the main Izluchino Construction-Machine Plant 
enterprise – which built earth-moving equipment for the defence ministry – into much 
smaller privatised companies, resulting in the loss of over 50 percent of Soviet-era 
blue-collar jobs, there are still a few significant (c.1000 workers) factory- or 
shop-floor-based enterprises, as well as specialist shops which employ from 10 to 100 
workers. The fact that Izluchino contained extractive and processing industry, as well as 
manufacturing, meant that its employment was, by Soviet standards, diversified, and this 
had an ameliorating effect on decline after 1991.5 In addition, the variety of 
industrial-related forms of work encountered in the site can be interpreted as the legacy of 
Soviet enterprises’ ‘high levels of autarky at the level of the plant’ (Gentile and Sjöberg 
2006: 714). Because the company town was a geographically isolated and bureaucratically 
discrete unit of production operating within an economy typified by shortages it created for 
itself a very significant web of support and maintenance micro-operations (e.g. vehicle 
repair shops) designed to support core activities. This has been called a ‘do-it-yourself 
approach’ (Winiecki 1989, in Gentile and Sjöberg 2006: 714) with many jobs in peripheral 
activities. While the core enterprise no longer pulls workers from outside the district, and 
struggles to attract skilled workers due to low wages, the industrial zone contains a 
hinterland of inheritor businesses of the autarky type, now disaggregated from the main 
firm and fending for themselves. The existence of this diverse hinterland, alongside the 
relatively compressed public and social geography of the town, is crucial to understanding 
the existence of ready-made social network resources for informants in their exits from 
formal labour. Despite the demise of the single industrial employer, blue-collar work 
continues everywhere, along with the building of personal networks predicated on social 
and occupational positioning. Most blue-collar work pays only about $500 a month and 
even well-qualified professionals earn from $1000 a month, while living costs like food, 
heating and transport, are comparable to much of western Europe.6 Many people regularly 
spend over half their wages on basic foodstuffs; the declining purchasing power of workers 
is well documented as a key issue in industrial relations literature on Russia (Morrison 
2008: 143) and in-work poverty is characteristic of the whole post socialist space (Stenning 
et al. 2010). The income value of informal work is highly varied. Some work, like 
taxi-driving, allows autonomy but pays substantially less than formal work (perhaps only 
60 percent of a manufacturing wage). Other work like skilled moonlighting as a plumber 
or electrician can provide double a monthly wage in a matter of days (although the 
frequency of such work depends on luck and the extent of the worker’s contacts and 
network). Some younger workers commute to Moscow, 3 hours by bus to the north, or live 
on site there.7 There are very few other work opportunities for men in the formal economy 
– the service and retail sectors continue to be seen as ‘women’s work’,8 agricultural jobs are 
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scarce and poorly paid. In the local informal economy there are opportunities doing 
manual work in small-scale manufacturing (avoiding tax registration both for enterprise 
and worker), domestic construction and associated trades (e.g. plumbing) as well as the 
taxi-driving and other ‘un-skilled’ work mentioned at the beginning of this article.  
 
 
Interpreting Formal-employment Precarity: Individual Case Histories 
 
FORMAL TO INFORMAL WORKER MOVEMENT: FOUR CASE HISTORIES 
Research materials from a number of ‘case histories’ like key informant Sasha, can 
illustrate the multi-faced understanding and reaction to precarity in formal employment. 
Short working histories are presented of two informants who had left formal employment, 
one intermediate stage informant, partially dependent on formal employment, and a final 
informant remaining in formal employment but planning to leave, having built up an 
income stream of own-account informal work. These cases are not meant to be 
‘representative’ of blue-collar workers as a whole, but are nonetheless a summative selection 
of the range of entrepreneurial responses to in-work insecurity in the fieldsite studied. 
Key informant Volodia (44) had, like Sasha, done a three-year stint at the cement 
works when he had been in his early thirties. Prior to that he had been in permanent 
employment since leaving secondary education with the main Soviet-era enterprise. From 
the cement-works he had gone to a smaller plastic fabricating plant. Then he returned to 
the cement works for less than a year, before taking on a variety of irregular ‘jobs’ in the 
informal economy, as a night watchman for a parking lot, taxi-driving, and own-account 
car repair – mainly welding. In addition, self-provisioning on his one-acre family plot a few 
kilometres from town plays an important role, not in the household economy itself, but as 
a space that facilitates both informal work (he repairs cars in a garage there) but also the 
necessary social interaction with his extended social network in contrast to the more private 
space of his cramped town flat. At the plot he regularly entertains acquaintances in his 
small wooden house and Russian sauna. 
Key informant Dmitry (29) had begun working at one of the automobile plants in 
Kaluga at the beginning of my second field trip. But within a few months he had left the 
job and worked as a taxi-driver for six months. Prior to the automotive assembly plant job 
he had had a similar pattern of jobs to Volodia. After a further period of unemployment he 
worked in a number of seasonal and fixed-period informal trades – local construction, 
loading and unloading goods for local businesses, delivery driving, long-distance 
taxi-driving. Having spent time working in a number of local jobs, both informally and 
formally, Dmitry had built up a very extensive social network that was instrumental in 
giving him a steady supply of one-off cash jobs. He had sold his family plot to buy an 
expensive multi-purpose vehicle to facilitate his own-account work. 
Key informant Viktor (26) had partially withdrawn from the formal economy. He 
had done manual work for the local administrative authority for very low pay for a number 
of years. This had been interspersed by well-paid informal work in construction in Moscow 
and the locality. He finally gave up his formal employment after failing to secure 
compensatory benefits as a low-paid state-employed worker. After a period of 
unemployment he found lucrative seasonal work (7-9 months a year) in a small 
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unregistered shop-floor assembling PVC windows. In the remaining months of the year he 
either remained unemployed, sought work from one of his previous formal employers, or 
did small odd-jobs for cash. A younger unmarried man, Victor had a very wide and diverse 
social network which he successfully utilised to find informal work.  
Key informant Georgii (35) is perhaps the only ‘representative’ informant of a 
broader social category: the skilled ‘moonlighter’ with both formal and informal incomes. 
His remaining in permanent formal work while deriving significant extra income from 
informal labour is the most commonly encountered experience of the diverse economy in 
Russia (Williams and Round 2007: 2331). He drew a modest wage from specialised 
fabricating work in the plastic plant. A significant amount of time (some evenings and 
many weekends) was spent installing domestic heating and plumbing systems, an example 
of both ‘for profit’ self-employment for network-introduced clients (ibid), and paid favours 
within the extended social network itself (for example, a neighbour of Georgii’s 
mother-in-law). The unsociable and fatiguing nature of the informal work, and its very 
considerable financial risks and benefits (a single ‘job’ of 2-3 days can provide 200 percent 
of monthly take-home pay) meant that at the end of the fieldwork (December 2010), 
Georgii reported that he was considering leaving his formal employment, although the 
unusually generous benefits and flexible arrangements of the enterprise presented him with 
a difficult dilemma.  
 
 
INSECURITY INTERPRETED AS IN-WORK POVERTY 
Workers individually and collectively reflect on in-work poverty and inadequate 
remuneration and the lack of a social wage: ‘Basically I came to the conclusion that the 
[formal] jobs weren’t worth it. After a while I was looking at the time it took to earn the 
pittance and I would just come home and get really angry’ (Viktor).  
 
‘It’s humiliating, working for such a salary. It’s better to risk not working for a 
time. I can make up the equivalent to 3 months salary shovelling earth for 
some rich Muscovite working on a fancy dacha building site. At least they’re 
paying me real money. Then I can rest for a bit, keep my head down’ 
(Dmitry).  
 
‘Time isn’t money – you can’t earn it back. Taxi-driving, I can go at the pace I 
want. I can work a 24-hour shift, or do a long-trip to Moscow and back and 
make what I used to earn in a week or more in the factory. At least if I am 
sitting on my arse in my car I am still my own person. Nobody in my circle 
looks down on me for not having a permanent wage. It’s like the curse from 
that film: “May you have to live on a salary alone”’ (Sasha). 
 
‘I don’t work for the salary. No one does. Ok, we get a bonus for jobs but 
without the benefits, like good sick pay and holidays, we’d all be out the door. 
I admit that our boss is unusual in that […] he knows how to treat good 
workers. But even he can’t pay us a living wage.’ (Georgii)9 
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Informants also reported interpreting formal economy remuneration in ways that 
clearly linked it to the impossibility of household reproduction (the inability to save 
income for important long-term goals such as children’s education and housing), a short to 
medium-term calculation of the diminishing purchasing power of staple goods, and the 
explicit comparison to Soviet-era purchasing power for blue-collar workers more generally. 
The significance should also not be underestimated of a compact, homogenous social 
geography that facilitated extended social networks of workers with loose but tangible 
affinities as unjustly exploited, hard-working blue-collars (in explicit contradistinction to 
educated ‘penpushers’ or owners of capital). Some socialising that reinforces the sense of 
identity and dispositions occurs within rituals of hospitality: former and present colleagues 
meeting in communal spaces and on family plots.10 However much of the maintenance of 
networks largely just happens – just in passing, in terms of the inevitable, sometimes 
multiple daily encounters of acquaintances in the focal public spaces of the town (a single 
market space, a very small number of shops, a single cross-roads where multiple work 
busses pick up shifts at the same time). 
 
 
INSECURITY UNDERSTOOD AS INDIVIDUALISED AND 
(SELF-)DISCIPLINING WORK-RELATIONS 
Despite ubiquitous reflection on the reality of in-work poverty among workers in 
Izluchino, by no means was low remuneration the only salient characteristic of informants’ 
dissatisfaction with formal work and their consideration of exits to informal labour. As 
some of the responses indicate, experiences of formal work led to reflections on the 
meaning of work in terms of ‘being one’s own person’. Experiences of formal work were 
strongly correlated with feelings of shame and a lack of self-esteem as a result of changing 
work relations, specifically regarding the imperative to self-regulate in contexts where work 
was already demeaning (due to conditions or pay) and similarly, the micro-level of 
surveillance from intermediary managers, whether workers resisted or complied with this 
imperative. Exit to informal work, whether own-account or not, was understood as at least 
a ‘lesser evil’ and at best, a transformative experience on personhood.  
The response among workers to the increasing individualisation of shop-floor 
relations must be understood in contrast to Soviet-era practices, incentive and disciplinary 
practices which were ‘personalised’ (Morrison 2008: 135) but not ‘individualised’.   
Negotiations and bargaining on issues which materially affected workers, such as bonuses, 
piece-work rates, overtime and so on, were highly personalised, in that individual brigade 
leaders and managers exercised a large degree of discretion (Morrison 2008: 139) and, like 
Burawoy’s findings on Hungary, Russian workers exercised some degree of autonomy on 
the shop-floor. However, the individual workers within a team were not subject to the 
same surveillance and subordinating imperatives of today’s workplace. The piece-rate 
norms were low and bonuses for completed work were paid as a matter of course (Morrison 
2008: 138) regardless of the quality of output varying between individuals. Even good 
teams often contained below-average workers in terms of productivity, whose individual 
contribution, or lack of it, was masked by the overall team return. The new imperatives of 
subordination of all aspects of the production process to constant monitoring by multiple 
levels of supervisors beyond the immediate production unit, and the unrelenting pressure 
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from such authorities for workers to become flexible and regulate themselves to the 
supervisors’ understanding of the imperatives of the production world was now cause of 
much resentment. 
Even in the smallest and tightest-knit of worker teams examined, Georgii’s plastic 
fabricating brigade, the expectation to become subordinated units of production was keenly 
felt. I witnessed this at first hand during a site visit: an expected delivery of raw materials 
did not arrive and Georgii’s team was then rebuked by the foreman of another team for not 
immediately setting to a number of routine tasks, such as resetting lathes, cleaning 
equipment and bringing in raw materials from an outside store – mainly duties that were 
primarily the responsibility of auxiliary workers. The foreman went to find the shift 
manager and Georgii’s men quickly set about making themselves look busy. When the 
supervisors returned, an empty delivery truck suddenly arrived and all hands were called on 
to load it for a customer. Another argument ensued, this time in another team as a worker 
complained that the loading work meant he had to leave his temperature-critical fabricating 
work, delaying its completion. Later Georgii discussed the incident:  
 
‘They expect us to be everywhere at once and still deliver the product before the 
deadline. The supervisors are like wasps, they just buzz around and distract 
you. But if I had complained today, they’d write me up in the report and that 
would be my bonus gone anyway. […] It is ridiculous sometimes the lengths 
they go to to find something for you to do. They can’t stand it if you don’t 
look busy. I mean it is the good teams that suffer like this if they work well and 
finish quickly. They’ve even tried to give us brooms to sweep out the shop 
when everyone knows there’s no point. The shift-supervisor is a real bastard, in 
front of everyone he says to us [brigade leaders] can’t you use your damned 
initiative and find something constructive for the team to do […] The point is 
the supervisors are just nobodies, they’re informants. We’re the ones that do 
the work, they do nothing, just watch us the whole time. They shouldn’t be 
able to talk to us like that: we’re a team with status; the boss knows we always 
do a good job.’  
 
Georgii’s frustration was shared by his team. The following day, one of his workers quit 
because of the incident. He explained to Georgii in far earthier terms that he couldn’t be 
bothered with the hassle anymore. 
Similar resentment towards the discourse of the ‘subordinate, yet flexible’ worker 
enforced by micro surveillance were expressed by Volodia, recounting experience as a 
forklift driver at the cement factory: 
  
I can load a lorry with bags of cement like I am stacking matchboxes but it 
doesn’t cut me any slack. I could do it with my eyes closed. But if I’m on a 
night shift, finish with three hours to go and then have a sleep in the back they 
act like I’m some kind of thief. 
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Volodia had left the cement works for the second time after his resistance to being given 
‘filling-in’ duties on top of his fork-lift driving led to him being punished with more 
unsociable shift hours and enforced (unpaid) leave during a seasonally slack period.   
Dmitry had told anyone who would listen about landing a job at the new auto 
plant in Kaluga. When he quit after only a few months I expected him to encounter at least 
some social opprobrium from his kith and kin (his work-life was the subject of informant 
group discussion both in his presence and absence). After all, the wages at the plant were 
about 30 percent higher than the average in Izluchino, and benefits significant. Dmitry, 
however, very effectively put across his argument across to his confreres that, as he saw it, 
no self-respecting working person could put up with the supposedly reflexive, yet regimented, 
environment of the car plant. Expecting to be put on the assembly plant straight away, he 
found that for the first few weeks he was put in with a mainly female team not even 
unpacking parts, but simply stripping the protective polythene covering from wooden 
crates. He had ‘put up with this’, understanding it to be a test of his willingness to 
subordinate himself to the needs of the plant. However, once he had made it on to the 
assembly line he found life there no less difficult. ‘Those foreigner managers, they stick their 
nose into every detail of what’s going on in the line.’  
Dmitry objected to having to continually account for his actions, when, as he saw 
it, he was just getting on with the job. Ironically, he decided to leave the plant because of an 
episode where he was subject to scrutiny and rebuke due to his effective ‘self-regulation’ at 
work. When on the assembly-line, he shadowed another worker, who quickly showed him 
the relatively limited repertoire of repetitive tasks on their part of the line – fixing parts of 
the exhaust system to the underside of the chassis. This task involved repeatedly moving 
back to a work bench a short distance from the line to select the correct sized fixings for the 
next section of piping. Dmitry recounted how he had been very surprised at the detailed 
training sessions he had gone through before starting on the line (including video 
instruction) despite picking up what to do more quickly from the shadowing. He also 
found it remarkable to see how much the foreign managers had stressed adhering to the 
production-line protocol in terms of the very specific ordering of tasks. At the same time, 
training discourses repeatedly emphasised the importance of initiative and adaptability – the 
company wanted workers who could ‘teach themselves’ and work on multiple parts of the 
line at short notice. Dmitry saw a quick production shortcut in breaking the particular 
protocol of under-chassis work. A couple of weeks into the assembly line job he began 
loading his capacious dungarees pockets with the exact number of each bolts he needed for 
several chassis mountings. He could hold his compressed-air gun in his right hand while 
selecting by feel in his pocket the correct sized bolt with the other hand. This reduced the 
number of trips to the work bench, speeding up his work. Dmitry had found a 
kinaesthetically intuitive short-cut but messed up the accounting and checking procedure – 
essential to the effective replenishment of the parts to the line by other workers. The 
telling-off he received when observed by the foreign line manager was mild, but it 
confirmed what Dmitry already had learned from the initial task he’d been given at the 
beginning of his work at the plant: shop-floor culture was not actually about being 
‘reflexive’, but subordinating oneself to preconceived notions of orderly enterprising: ‘You 
have to do it their way or it is wrong. Even if you’ve worked it out yourself and you are 
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right!’ The relative autonomy under socialism that led to worker-centred ‘fixes’ for specific 
production problems was perceived to have been lost. 
 
 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS FOR DEVELOPING AN 
ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSE ON WORK 
Soon after this episode, Dmitry left the plant and started using his large MPV to 
facilitate a variety of own-account work. The context of much of the discussion related 
above was social meetings between Dmitry and other former-colleagues, some of whom 
worked at the car plant, others he had worked with at the cement factory. This circle 
included Viktor, who had briefly worked with Dmitry. Viktor’s present place of work – the 
unregistered PVC window assembly shop – was one of the social spaces of interaction 
between these former and present colleagues. This ‘drop-in’ space – connected to manual 
work but also sociality and leisure – was an important site for the accessing of a shared sense 
of worker identity. However it was also a key site for practicing cultural repertoires of 
resistance to formal work, in the form of shared discursive representation of it, and of the 
embodiment of possibilities for survival outside it. The shop and other social venues such as 
family plots and the compressed social geography of the public spaces of the town also 
provided plenty of opportunity for more mundane maintenance of class-embedded social 
networks that facilitated alternative sources of work outside the formal economy. It was by 
‘dropping-in’, that Viktor had found the seasonal assembly work at the shop in the first 
place. He had kept in touch with an extended network of labourers he had worked with in 
construction. Through one of these he had come to the shop socially to drink vodka, only 
to find work their later. In turn Dmitry’s connection to Victor had brought some informal 
delivery work to the former from the shop.  
If the social capital associated with being a one-time colleague or worker’s friend 
allows access to a circle or network of peers and crucially, shared values and codes relating 
to the merits of control over labour processes – something resembling a ‘meta-occupational 
community’ (Van Maanen and Barley 1984) – then the articulation of alternative forms of 
social reproduction are possible in the ongoing socialisation of individuals and households 
within such a milieu. Dmitry saw that Viktor was doing all right on his seasonal work and 
own-account jobs and in turn Viktor picked up and reinforced Dmitry’s interpretation of 
the unreasonable demands of the car plant on him: 
 
‘It’s not like you’re raw clay, is it? They can’t just keep making you in to 
whatever they want […] a normal citizen knows how to do many different 
things and so won’t lose out’. Viktor then commented on his transition to 
own-account work: ‘There [at the plant] we had to work more for our money. 
We couldn’t just work as much as they paid us, it wasn’t enough for them. 
Now we work just as much as we want. Even if it is for less.’  
 
Another informant Kolya, said of the same topic: ‘You can make the decision yourself 
[about when and how to work], even if you’re working for someone else [such as in own 
account plumbing jobs]. He’s paying you for the result, not to do it his way. He should 
know you’ll do a good job and will let you get on with it.’  
  229
Discussion and Conclusion 
‘Normative’ industrial work in Russia, now that it is often not paid well enough 
to support household reproduction, is no longer seen as ‘normal’; for some workers the lack 
of security on the job makes it precarious. ‘Security’ is understood in a complex way relating 
to wages allowing more than poverty-level consumption, some degree of autonomy and 
recognition of status at work, as well a general acknowledgement within enterprises of the 
dignity of blue-collar work. Most workers’ understandings of formal work as insecure relate 
to their access to mnemonic and lay normative resources that allow comparison, both with 
the past, and with a putative ‘normal’ working class existence, to which post-socialist reality 
does not measure up. Before 1991, an explicit contract existed between the paternalistic, 
state employer acting as social guarantor and the dependent worker, and a cult of work and 
strong formal and informal sanctions against parasitism facilitated the normalisation of a 
corporatized worker who, while lacking an organisational base to challenge the often 
terrible working conditions and pay under socialism, wielded some power and more 
significantly, autonomy at the shop-floor level (Alasheev 1995) and, due to the ritualised 
transparent exploitation of labour, were able to develop an immanent critique of their 
society – the ‘negative class consciousness’ of workers (Burawoy 1992: 134-5) . Once 
marketised economic relations and neoliberal reforms were adopted, leading to very 
significant deterioration in benefits, entitlements and wages for those lucky enough not to 
be laid off, the very powerful disincentives against rejection of formal work – 
administrative-legal, stigma and worker-enterprise dependency, became increasingly 
meaningless. In addition, liberalisation and marketisation have increased the amount of 
‘work’ in the informal economy that is available – however lacking in dignity it may be. 
Indeed, the generally small-scale informal enterprises encountered in the research are a 
crucial ‘pressure-valve’ not only ‘in the face of overly excessive barriers in the formal 
economy’ (Andrews et al. 2011: 7), but in providing work and incomes comprising nearly 
half Russia’s GDP. Trends in the diversity of sources of income which in any case were 
already significant the socialist economy, become even more crucial, whether the 500 
roubles ($15) a landless peasant gets for a day collecting mushrooms for his rich Muscovite 
neighbour, to the sum ten times that obtained by the moonlighting plumber in fitting out 
a large flat with central heating. ‘Shock therapy’ was applied in transforming Russia from a 
command to a market economy. Despite the twenty years that have passed, the memory of 
transition is still meaningful in assessing what is ‘normal’ and what is not. The rapid, as 
opposed to incremental, erosion of the working-wage and living standards in formal 
employment, entitlements and benefits means that formal work as insecure is felt acutely. 
Where nothing in everyday working life is normal anymore, informants are more willing to 
try out alternative ways of maintaining household reproduction. Formal employment then 
has many downsides. In Russia, for both historical and contemporary reasons formal work 
is even less attractive than it is for many in the west. 
The model of the neoliberal subject as self-regulating in order to maximise human 
capital requires personal technologies of monitoring and evaluation. ‘Self-esteem’ and 
shame are seen as technologies that assist governmentality and produce more malleable 
subjectivities (Cruickshank 1993). Being in work in a formal employment setting and 
drawing a regular wage is a formidably anchoring experience in a person’s valuation of self. 
But judging the labouring self is problematic given the seismic collective-individualised 
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shift in the structuring of risk from socialist to postsocialist contexts. Once again, a 
pre-market ‘cosmology’ (Verdery 1996) or ‘mnemonic resources’ of the socialist period 
(Straugh 2007) are still accessible to individuals and households allowing negative 
comparison of the present with a mythic but meaningful past social contract with labour.11 
Self-esteem for informants increasingly comes to be associated with non-dependence on the 
derisory returns and formal work, which simultaneously requires subjection of the self to 
both external and individualised regulative technologies that compare unfavourably with 
Soviet-era labour discipline. 
Therefore the weakness of external and internal governmentality to stop 
informants frequently telling their employers to ‘stuff their jobs’ has also to be understood 
within the specific cultural and social contexts of labour under post socialism. The 
corporate character of the employer-employee relationship that developed under socialism 
that led to a significant degree of labour quiescence and dependency (Friebel and Guriev 
2000) also resulted in enduring worker identities and social networks. The entire labour 
force of single towns was often concentrated in a single enterprise – the company town. 
Enterprises and firms socially embedded themselves in a worker’s life through the provision 
of benefits like shops, garden plots, kindergartens, canteens, transportation. Likewise, 
workers were socially embedded in their firms as the spaces of work, leisure and social 
reproduction overlapped and gave rise to shared identities and loyalties, despite the often 
difficult living conditions in reality. Elizabeth Dunn has characterised these interpersonal 
social obligations as resulting in ‘embedded personhood’: self-conscious subjectivities of 
labour (2004: 162-74). The enterprises within which worker identity was embedded 
withered after 1991, and with them the infrastructural and social supports for workers that 
created dependency.  
However, while post-socialist workforces shrank to a fraction of their former size, 
social relationships and work-related identities retained significant meaning. The reliance 
of Eastern Europeans generally on informal social networks of favours and mutual aid has 
been much studied (Caldwell 2004, Dunn 2004, Ledeneva 1998, Patico 2008). 
Established under socialism as a general response to lack, these networks, especially given 
the insecurity, not only of employment, but of other essential services generally such as 
healthcare and housing, endure beyond the circumstances of their creation. Thus, as 
individuals move on to other occupations and lives, they are still able to access support 
based on what was often a shared work-based and place-specific identity. The existence for 
many households of an extended, often work-related social network is important for 
understanding the willingness of those in insecure work to risk further economic 
marginalisation outside formal employment.12 It is striking that existing institutional 
frameworks (social support networks) from a previous form of economic organization are 
shaping outcomes in a more market-oriented economic reality. Arguably these are denser 
networks than those that exist in the west where people tend to move around more and 
hence are less rooted into their communities. 
The individual, faced with increasing insecurity, may well be a ‘designer, juggler 
and stage director of his or her own biography’ (Beck 1997: 95), but the overall 
performance is dependent on a hidden array of back-stage staff (social capital called upon 
or latent) and the specific cultural history of the theatre (the spatiotemporal context). The 
particular reliance on horizontal networks in Russia (Dunn 2004: 119) – i.e. the fact that 
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mutual aid takes place mainly within one’s own socio-economic milieu – indicates that 
social capital of the marginalised is just that, marginal. But at the same time it indicates the 
ongoing salience of class as an interpretive category in debates around precarity. If we are to 
understand insecure workers’ agency, then we need to look at identity, for it is in shared 
identities that we discover the reality of social networks and mutual aid.  
 
 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1.  Dunn traces the less than successful adoption of Taylorist/Fordist production 
techniques in the Soviet Union and like Burawoy shows how the production bottlenecks 
and institutional niceties of socialist led to a greater degree of self-management on the shop 
floor (2004: 9-18). In another chapter Dunn provides a pertinent discussion of neoliberal 
governmentality applied to post-socialist production. (2004: 94-129). 
 
2.  The UN classes Russia as in ‘transition’: neither a developed nor developing country 
(2010). In terms of national income per capita, Russia is usually classed as an upper-middle 
income country (World Bank 2010), which, due to the unequal distribution of its vast 
natural resources wealth, is a definition of little explanatory value for understanding 
actually lived experience of most workers.  
 
3.  To protect the anonymity of my informants I use a pseudonym for the town. I have 
also changed individuals’ names and obscured some details pertaining to the nature of 
enterprises.  
 
4. Inevitably, the term blue-collar is a simplification of the variety of manual, semi-skilled 
and skilled heavy and medium industry jobs available in the Izluchino enterprise, however, 
despite the valid objections to this term (Spencer 1977) it usefully serves as a heurisitic tool 
in that it captures the main characteristics of much of the normative employment in the 
district – full-time, production-based subordinate, etc. 
 
5.  Due to the construction boom in Moscow some local enterprises have expanded 
significantly. For a fuller discussion of the changing fortunes of company towns and the 
role of their ‘inherited conditions’ after 1991, see Golubchikov 2006. 
 
6.  The average district pay was 16000 roubles/month, approximately three quarters of 
the national average of around 20000 roubles, or $675/month (Rosstat 2010a). The 
‘subsistence minimum’, or poverty line, for the region was 5400 roubles/month for people 
of working age in December 2010 (Rosstat 2010b). It is important to stress the large 
disparity between incomes in Moscow and outside the capital. Comparable blue- and 
white-collar work in the former is often at least twice as well paid. 
 
7.  Over 10 percent of the oblast work-force is employed in Moscow. 
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8.  Lehmann and Ruble (1997) provide a figure of 17 percent female skilled labour 
employment in their case study of a provincial city. In Izluchino the figure is less than 10 
percent. 
 
9.  Georgii’s employer also offered low-interest loans to all employees, a very unusual 
situation. 
 
10.  C.f. ‘bench-work’: social interaction on public seating that help shape the classed 
public spaces in front of apartment housing blocks in Romania (Kideckel 2004: 46). 
 
11. Mnemonic resources do not just refer to individual or shared memory of ‘better’ 
working lives under socialism, but may also include physical or spatial elements such as 
photographs, memorials and soviet era constructions that evoke unfavourable comparison 
of the present with the past. For example informants often discussed their personal 
contribution to production in the Soviet era that led to improvements in the standard of 
living in their town – the construction of infrastructure and housing, for example.  
 
12. Pahl (1980) argues that a work-related identity can be maintained after having left a 
particular employment especially if the person has particular skills that can be utilised in 
the alternative economy (in Harding and Jenkins 1989: 24).  
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